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| K e n s m e n : 4 3 r d B o m b G r o u p (H), 5 t h A A F | ||
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The following
was sent by John Kubiak, son of Edmund Kubiak o the 403rd SQ.
Typos and page breaks in the original report have been kept intact. HEADQUARTERS
43rd BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) OFFICE OF THE RCM OFFICER 28 AUGUST, 1945
- RCM - Radio of Radar counter Measures is divided into four different and separate branches: 1. Detiection, or location of enemy Radars by means of receivers, analyzers, and special antenna assemblies; 2. De- ception, or the 'fooling' of the enemy Radars into 'seeing' more air craft or surface vessels on their scopes than there are actually are present in the Radars immediate vincity by means or electronic and mechanical gagwets; 3. Jamming or saturating the enemy Radars so they are unable to 'read-through' the presentations on their scopes and interpret the number, azimuth, and range of our air craft and surface vessels, accom- plised by electronic and mechanical devices; 4. Anti-jamming, or "un- saturating' our enemy-jammed scopes by electrical circuits and tech- nical techniques. RCM as used in this Bomb Group was concerned only in jamming of enemy SLC and AAFC Radars. The 43rd's RCM program is the youngest of the Fifth Air Force Heavy Group. The program first got it's start with Major Foster H. Hunt- Er, then Captain, handling the adnisnistrative and operational side, With a Mr. Daeakins, a Technical Representative from RRL in Boston, taking care of the technical end of the Group's program. RCM was ham- pered by lack of equipment, experienced maintenance personnel, and Class A instalations in the Group's air craft. However, this handicap has been overcome, and at the colose of the war with Japan, this RCM Organization was as efficient and smoothly-run as any in this theatre. 2.RCM(cont) Our RCM personnel consists of the following: 1st Lt. William M. Weinbach, Jr. as Group RCM Officer, who joined the Group at Clark Field in April '45; @nd Lt. Harold B. von Horn, RCM Operations Officer; 2nd Lt. Edmund E. Kubiak, and 2nd Lt. Robert F. Yaffee as RCM Maintenan Officers. Under the control of Lt. Von Horn were nine enlister operators. One a Cpl. McKay, was killed-in-action over Tainan in May '45. Lt's Kubiak and Yaffee were assisted in maintenance and installation by twelve Enlisted mechanics. Lt. Weinbach directed all RCM activities, procured equipment, and prepared reports, daily and weekly, which were sent to Fifth Air Force, V BomCom, and Sec.22 of GHQ. A typical RCM plan was put into effect as follows: From Group Oper tions it would be learned that a mission was planned, target and numbere of air craft to be used. From RCM maps and reports edited and published by Sec. 22 of GHQ, the tppype and number of enemy SLC and AAFC Radars were ascertained. From V BomCom a suggested RCM plan and summary of enemy activities was obtained. The number of Raven(RCM) air craft and type of equipment was then chosen. Squadron Operations were notified, and Squadron Intelligence were told the RCM plan for their Squadron. Operators were briefed, equipment installed, and the enemy befuddled! After the mission, operators were interrogated, maps of rouyte drawn, overlays developed, equipment checked, maintenance given, and reports written and distributed. 3.RCM(cont) Interrogation of German PORWs, who were ground Radar operators, proved that RCM against SLC and AAFC Radars, in the European Theater, was 70% effective during complete cloud coverage. This means that the German Radars were less than one third as effective as they would have Been withour RCM, causing the Germans to throw up a barrage type of AA fire. This meant a great increase in the expenditure of ammonition, and a decrease in the loss of Allied lives and air craft. Sec. 22 of GHQ, the RCM Intelligence Unit in this theater, is, at present, compiling data and drawing charts from information gotten by the interrogation of Allied crews and Jap POWs; captured documents, and the intrepertation of RCM operators logs. From all indications the percentage of the effect- iveness of RCM of the Pacific Theater against SLC and AAFC Radars will be still greater than that of the European Theater. When RCM was first used in quantity in the 43rd, it met with many and all obstacles. Pilots all but refused to fly the special equipment and it's operator, crew-members wouldn't cooperate. They couldn't or wouldn't believe that 150 pounds of the 'right' equipment with an oper- ator wearing ear-phones logging signals and twisting knobs, was, in reality instrumental in 'bringin'-'em-back-alive'! The worth of RCM had to be proven to them. And RCM was proven: By crews from the 63rd report- ing that emeny search-lites were tracking RCM Rope instead of their air craft; by 'loosing' the gboggie air craftwho were tracking them with Radar when RCM Chaff was dropped by our crews; by crews returning from A 'hot' target and reporting two or three air craft holed instead of 4.RCM(cont) A wing or engine shot away. RCM has proven it's worth and is 'bringin' 'em-bach-alive'! The all conclusive proof is that the crews ASK for RCM before they go on a mission. The RCM Program in this Group has saved lives, air craft, and prev ed a maintenance problem. RCM in the Pacific Theater has hastened V-J Day (and cold beer.) RRL---Radio Research Lab SLC---Search Lite Control AAFC--Anti-Aircraft Fire Control POW---Prisonoer of War Rope--Mechanical RCM Chaff+ " " AA----Anti-Aircraft WILLIAM M. WEINBACH, JR.
1st LT. 43rd Bomb Group (H) Group RCM Officer |
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